



**Towards Partnership
for
Effective Human Rights Fieldwork**

A discussion paper of

The International Human Rights Network

The International Human Rights Network

This paper is based on the work of the International Human Rights Network and its predecessor *The International Human Rights Trust* established in Ireland in 1996. IHRN is a non-governmental organisation supporting actors in applying [Human Rights Based Solutions](#) in their work and details may be found at <http://www.ihrnetwork.org>. The process of development of this report was kindly supported by the Commission of the European Union and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs. Originally published by Genprint Ltd. Dublin. Ireland, 1996.

Key principles and approaches

The IHRN advocates, among other approaches, the Sustainability Principle which requires:

“That Human Rights Operations must be based on the assessed needs of a host society, and co-ordinated with other complementary initiatives, so as to best contribute to a sustainable improvement of the human rights situation as part of an overall human rights strategy. This requires the active participation of the host society.”

The sustainable approach to human rights operations has received the support of the Development Committee of the European Parliament and the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs Mary Robinson.

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In 1995 he was appointed the European Union's Coordinator for *the UN Human Rights Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR)*. More recently, he has acted as a consultant to the European Union on human rights issues including leading human rights identification missions to Togo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He has recently been conferred with the *Knighthood of the Order of Gregory the Great* for his life's work for development and justice. He was co-founder and co-Director of *The International Human Rights Trust* from 1996-2003.

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More recently, she advises a range of inter-governmental organisations from Unicef to ECHO on integrating human rights into their work at all levels from policy to training - as well as advising humanitarian and human rights NGOs. She is honorary research fellow in the University of Nottingham's *Human Rights Law Centre* and appointed as expert member of the *Irish Department of Foreign Affairs Standing Committee on Human Rights*. She authored *Towards Effective Training for Field Human Rights Tasks* (1996) as well as the discussion paper *Towards a Human Rights Partnership for Effective Field Work* (1998). She co-authored with Brian McKeown *The European Union and Human Rights Field Operations: if, when, how and with whom*, a policy discussion paper requested by the European Commission.

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Summary¹

This paper is part of the on-going reflections of the International Human Rights Network and is circulated to stimulate debate and generate feedback from readers. A draft was presented at the International Symposium “Strengthening Human Rights Operations” convened by the German Government and co-sponsored by the Republics of Poland and South Africa, at Koningswinter (Bonn) on 26-27 May 1998. The issues it raises remain highly relevant in the on-going debate.

The paper outlines a conceptual framework based on the mandate of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as the internationally designated leader charged with ensuring that the imperatives of law, principle, and the lessons of past experience are translated into human rights best practices - and applied for the future.²

Part I Human rights operations at a watershed

The starting premise is that past human rights operations should not automatically be a model for future field activities of the Office of the High Commissioner. Rather, it contends that a watershed has been reached and the opportunity for fresh approaches should be seized (part I). This view is premised on two sets of factors.

Firstly, the far-reaching changes in the operating environment of human rights operations.

Creation of the Office of High Commissioner: Almost all of the human rights operations have occurred prior to, or without meaningful input from, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The advent of that Office itself presents opportunities for creative leadership based on law and principle.

The legal imperative of mainstreaming: Field human rights tasks are not only carried out by “human rights operations” and accordingly the High Commissioner’s future field work should not be considered in isolation from other partners. In what can be seen as a breakthrough, the Secretary-General’s reform package aims to mainstream human rights across all the UN’s activities as a shared responsibility.³ Human rights operations in the past have not had the benefit of working with UN agencies whose human rights responsibilities were so expressly and clearly acknowledged. Vital questions arise:

¹ This paper was written by Karen Kenny. It should be cited as *Towards a Human Rights Partnership for Effective Field Work, a Policy Discussion Paper of the International Human Rights Network, 1996.*

² As such, the paper does not consider the question of which UN agency should take the lead operational role in fielding any future human rights operations.

³ *Report of the Secretary-General on Renewing the United Nations: a Programme for Reform, A/51/950, 14 July 1997.*

- a) *how will field partners such as UN Development Programme, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Unicef, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (military and police personnel) and others adapt to meet their field human rights responsibilities? And*
- b) *how will they relate to the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the field (and vice versa) ?*

Secondly, there are strong reasons of principle why the High Commissioner's future work should be distinguished from the operations of the past.

Ad hoc: Since 1991, human rights operations have taken place in an ad hoc, piecemeal fashion without a unifying concept regarding what they were to achieve or the techniques to be applied towards that end.

Reactive: Previous human rights operations have only been established during or after a large-scale human rights crisis, involving armed conflict. The future requires more emphasis on a concept of early warning and preventive field human rights work.

Accountability: Discussion of operations has been characterised by an almost complete absence of three vital elements:

- a) meaningful input from the *host society*⁴ in planning, designing, setting priorities for, and evaluating the impact of human rights operations;
- b) **systematic lessons learning** through feedback from personnel serving with these operations; and
- c) **independent evaluation** of their strengths and weaknesses.

Absence of clear rationale: The paper considers the three rationales most often presented for fielding human rights operations: presence as deterrence; monitoring and reporting to headquarters; technical assistance/institution building. None of these of themselves are found to present a compelling case. The real question is whether large-scale human rights operations are the most appropriate tool to achieve a specified goal in a particular situation. Their use should be weighed against other, perhaps more direct, means of channeling resources towards that identified goal in the host society.

Narrow field tasks: Before the Rwanda operation, human rights operations had generally been established to verify compliance of parties with peace agreements⁵. The main emphasis has been on fact-finding concerning some civil and political rights and reporting externally. Such human rights development work as has been carried out has been ad hoc, dependent on individual personalities and met internal opposition from those who argue that such was not "in the mandate". Over time, our

⁴ *Host society* is defined to include not only host authorities at all levels, but also the range of civil society actors such as non-governmental groups of all kinds (farmers' co-operatives, church and women's groups, trades unionists and so forth as well as human rights organisations as such).

⁵ Those agreements have reflected to varying degree the requirements of international human rights and humanitarian law.

understanding of field human rights tasks has become rather narrow and rigid. This has reinforced a tendency to look to the deploying body for solutions, rather than to the host society. Recruits, and particularly senior managers, have been drawn from a narrow range of skills relative to the range required. Artificial, unhelpful distinctions between “monitoring” and “technical assistance” have become common, while these terms are not clearly defined nor founded on principle.

Selective application of legal principle: Previous operations have not coherently applied the legal principles of the universality, inter-dependence and indivisibility of the full spectrum of human rights - whether in identifying and interpreting their mandates or in their daily tasks.

For all these reasons, and whatever their merits in their state-specific contexts, the human rights operations of the past should not automatically be considered as offering appropriate models for the future.

Part II

A new conceptual framework: Human Rights Support Programmes

The paper presents in outline IHRN’s alternative vision. It requires a fundamental re-think of the aim, attitude and methods of these human rights field activities.

Measuring success by sustainability: It requires that success be measured by the degree to which field presence contributes to a sustainable improvement in the human rights situation. That end is not achieved by seeking external solutions - but rather by engaging with, and facilitating, the host society’s efforts.

A new approach, a new name: The terminology proposed to encapsulate such future field work is *Human Rights Support Programmes*. This is because “support” conveys the fundamental shift in attitude towards a *constructive partnership based on the primacy of the host society*. It conveys *assisting and reinforcing* rather than replacing local efforts. Programme emphasises *process, long-term vision with sustainability at the core*. Similarly, those who work in these Programmes should be termed Human Rights Support *Partners*.

Authority: The High Commissioner has, *ex officio*, the authority to direct her activities to meeting host society needs. It is inherent in her mandate flowing from the UN Charter and international human rights law.

Host society dialogue: Each host society has a right and duty to determine its own human rights priorities - as reflected in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. In this way, the priorities of the Support Programme would be the result of meaningful dialogue with host society - including, but not limited to, public authorities at all levels.

Prevention: The Support Programme should facilitate the early involvement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in situations not yet at emergency-level. Based on long-term relationships, the approach should have enhanced local legitimacy. In view of the widespread need for Support Programmes, they should be the norm, rather than exceptional for states.

Two bundles of tasks: diagnosis and development: All Human Rights Support Programmes should conduct two types of on-going activities:

- a) *diagnostic monitoring*, to analyse, on an on-going basis, the precise source of weaknesses in the protection of human rights. Reflecting the principles of international human rights law, additional methods and indicators should be developed and applied for diagnosis in terms of economic, social and cultural rights, respecting their indivisibility and inter-dependence in practice. Based on that essential analysis, the Programme would follow-up its own recommendations concerning action by local authorities, other UN agencies, local non-governmental organisations and so forth and facilitate their fulfillment; and
- b) activities which the Programme would carry out building on its diagnosis would be termed its *human rights development tasks*. Varying according to the human rights development needs of the host society, these would range from providing training to local actors, through ensuring that its analysis guides other donor support to the host society.

Techniques: to be applied in Support Programmes should be built upon systematic debriefing of all staff and upon the independent evaluation of past human rights operations with meaningful input from the host societies concerned. In addition, the techniques should be premised on *two-way mainstreaming of human rights and development thinking*.

Capacity-building: As part of its consistent capacity-building approach, a Support Programme should apply a presumption in favour of employing elements of the host society.

Holistic: Human Rights Support Programmes would unite all of the High Commissioner's field-based work. It avoids unhelpful distinctions between human rights "operations" and "presences" and avoids the artificial dichotomy of field tasks as either "monitoring" or "technical assistance/institution-building".

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Part I

Human rights operations- at a watershed

1. Background

Field-based international human rights personnel are a phenomenon of this decade. Not only is resort to them increasing, but the range of inter-governmental organisations involved has expanded from the UN to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organisation of American States, the European Union - as well as non-governmental organisations.⁶ Sometimes UN human rights operations have been part of military peacekeeping operations, and in other cases independent of them. Because of their variety, human rights operations defy easy definition. However, for clarity we list those operations referred to in the present discussion.

The following were deployed by UN Headquarters in New York:

- the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL);
- the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a joint operation of the UN and the Organisation of American States;
- the human rights component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC);
- the human rights component of the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), Croatia; and
- the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA).

Although UN operations, the above developed almost entirely without input from the then Centre for Human Rights⁷ in Geneva or the previous High Commissioner. However, on taking up his post in April 1994, the first High Commissioner took the initiative of founding several human rights operations, the first being in Rwanda. The following can therefore be added to the list:

- the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda (HRFOR); and
- the Human Rights Field Operation in Burundi (HRFOB);

⁶ See generally, Karen Kenny, *Towards Effective Training for Field Human Rights Tasks: Recommending an on-going international process to codify best field practice*, International Human Rights Network, 1996, particularly section 5 and Annex IV.

⁷ Since September 1997, it is the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

- the High Commissioner designates the field presence in former Yugoslavia as another. It dates from Spring 1993, prior to the creation of the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁸

The new High Commissioner has therefore inherited a number of operations. In addition, she has inherited and continues to expand a rapidly multiplying matrix of what her Office calls "field presences" - understood to be smaller numbers of field-based international personnel. A total of twenty-two of these operations/presences are projected by her Office to be in place by 1999.⁹

Furthermore, two current Missions of Long Duration of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are large-scale human rights operations:

- the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the agreement initialed at Dayton on 21 November 1995; and
- the Expanded OSCE Mission to Croatia authorised under Permanent Council Decision 176 in 1997.

In addition, the European Commission has also been active in supporting the development of field presences by the United Nations - in Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and Colombia for example - not only providing finance but also personnel, in some cases complete with self-supporting logistics, administration and equipment.

The activities catalogued above are referred to in this paper as "human rights operations". However, IHRN emphasises in its work that field human rights tasks are not restricted to such operations (see mainstreaming in part II).

⁸ See Kenny K, "Formal and Informal Innovations in the United Nations Protection of Human Rights: The Special Rapporteur on the former Yugoslavia", *Austrian Journal of Public and International Law*, 48 19-77 (1995). This is an expanding field operation with the recent increase of violence in Kosovo.

⁹ See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html>

2. Field work: the need for coherence and consistency based on law

In 1991, the San Jose accord was signed between the two parties to the civil war in El Salvador. This was a human rights accord signed prior to full peace negotiations and led to a first UN civilian human rights specialist field operation. For six months before a ceasefire was agreed, with on-going combat and before the UN military and police contingents arrived, human rights officers engaged in fact-finding to verify compliance of the parties with the San Jose accord.¹⁰

Two years later, in 1993, the UN assisted the parties to the Rwandese civil war in negotiations which led to the Arusha Agreement being signed by them in August that year. The UN Security Council agreed to provide a military peacekeeping force to verify compliance with the Agreement. Ignoring the prescient warnings and concrete recommendations for action published at that time by the Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the UN failed to ensure that human rights concerns were central to the peace agreement. Indeed, a specialist human rights division was not provided as part of the military peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR.¹¹ Six months later, the military peacekeeping operation was in place and genocide exploded in April 1994.

In 1991, it might have appeared that the UN had learned that, as the Secretary-General has recently stated, *"today's human rights violations are the causes of tomorrow's conflicts"*.¹² However, for El Salvador the UN had not come to the negotiations to advocate, or insist on, addressing the human rights causes of the conflict nor the violations which were a feature of its prosecution. Rather, these issues were insisted upon by one of the parties - the armed opposition group, which had always seen them as essential to resolving the conflict.

Since then, all the human rights operations mentioned above have been undertaken in an entirely ad hoc, piecemeal fashion. Failure by the UN to apply the axiomatic link between human rights violations and armed conflict in the Rwanda case graphically illustrates this lack of a coherent, human rights-based approach to its field work. This is a key challenge to be addressed by the Secretary-General's mainstreaming of human rights analysis across all the activities of the UN, and one of the reasons why the High Commissioner for Human Rights is at a watershed of opportunity to provide leadership across the system.

3. The absence of a clear rationale for human rights operations

One, or all of three rationales are frequently raised to justify fielding a human rights operation. These are, presence as deterrence, monitoring and reporting to

¹⁰ The mission, ONUSAL, eventually stayed for approximately five years with three disciplines (civilian human rights specialists, police and military) working for the first time within a peacekeeping operation).

¹¹ A small police component was included in UNAMIR.

¹² Statement by Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN to the opening of the fifth-fourth session of the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 16 March 1998.

headquarters of the sending organisation, technical assistance/ institution-building.

i) Presence as deterrence: Deterrence is frequently used as a rationale for human rights operations in an emergency context. While all such operations so far have been born in an emergency, this rather begs the question as to whether a “soft-skinned” human rights operation is in fact the most effective deterrent - *detering exactly which types of human rights violation, in what type of situation*. A considered use of this rationale would require each human rights operation to identify at planning stage whether civilian human rights specialists should be used rather than UN civilian police, UN military, local human rights defenders or a combination. Whatever the optimum mix of personnel identified, they should then be fielded and instructed to work in ways which maximise their deterrent effect. However, despite the frequency with which the rationale is raised, there is a dearth of systematic practice of active deterrence in human rights operations.¹³ Generally, human rights officers are left to identify or create for themselves opportunities for deterrence as their personality or previous experience dictates. This carries self-evident attendant dangers - for the operation, the human rights officer, and of course, their local interlocutors.

Gauging success of a human rights operation in terms of human rights violations prevented, is by definition difficult. The latter are notoriously difficult to measure with any reliability. Therefore, caution must be exercised in asserting that a deterrent effect has been achieved. Unfortunately, due to pressures such as funding concerns, a human rights operation frequently falls into the trap of claiming credit for anything positive which may occur - while bemoaning negative events as being beyond its influence. What is clear, however, is that mere presence does not equate with deterrence.

Whatever effect some would presume, presence for the purpose of deterrence is by definition a short-term, non-sustainable justification for a large-scale human rights presence.

Linked to presence as deterrence is the question of interventions in individual cases. Such interventions can have immediate visible positive effects, such as improving prison conditions, and are a source of encouragement to field personnel involved. They are important in themselves as assisting a victim of a human rights violation concerning a human being and they can be important means of identifying patterns of violations for the purpose of targeting remedial recommendations. However, their importance as a justification for a human rights operation can be over-stated. Interventions in an individual's case by a human rights operation can have negative effects for an individual especially where there is poor selection and training of staff or management. Examples include the punishment of prisoners when a visitor identified those from whom complaints about the prison authorities had been received. In addition, interventions can generally be made in only a few cases relative to the widespread need for protection which has been a feature of human rights operations deployed in emergencies. They rarely have the kind of powers needed to ensure a difference is made in an individual case or to meet the public's expectations. Finally, there may be more general negative effects if the approach used is that of replacing, rather than reinforcing, the local system (dependency, adding to a self-perpetuating public mistrust of the state system, and so forth).

¹³ One exception is the relatively developed practice of systematic visits to places of detention, including prisons. The lead specialist is the International Committee of the Red Cross. It has long understood the imperative of responsibly developing doctrine and practice - and then recruiting and rigorously training staff in its application.

ii) Monitoring: This is the second, and most frequently used rationale: a human rights operation is needed for information-gathering. Increasingly, human rights operations are perceived as being primarily for monitoring, and that monitoring is adequate as an end in itself.

This may be partly because almost all of the human rights operations until Rwanda were established to verify compliance with peace agreements. Another reason for this perception may be again due to the fact that all the operations were carried out as emergency deployments during a crisis. In this urgent context, a high proportion of personnel was naturally recruited from the international human rights non-governmental organisations which had led the development of fact-finding techniques and “mobilisation of shame” during the Cold War. Those techniques had been developed by them in the context of fact-finding from outside a country with occasional on-site visits - and concentrating on a small area of civil and political rights due to the NGOs’ particular specialised focus.

Of necessity, the NGO traditional method of gathering information involved little, if any, on-site visits. This was either due to lack of access, resources, or adequate information was sent to them from local human rights defenders. This illustrates the difficulty of seeing fact-finding, *of itself*, as a sufficient justification for a large-scale field presence. There are many methods of fact-finding regarding a human rights situation which can be combined to obtain an accurate overall picture.¹⁴ These include traditional methods such as short on-site visits, access to refugees outside the country, information gathered by local or international sources within the country. Indeed, during the conflicts which have featured these human rights operations, it has been frequently the case that a better overview can be obtained outside the country than within it.¹⁵

Whatever the merits of this in the specific context of verifying compliance with peace agreements,¹⁶ the result has been that inter-governmental human rights operations have now in effect adopted the narrow focus and techniques developed by non-governmental organisations for a very different context and been satisfied with an overly modest aim. This is a particularly inadequate approach for the High Commissioner as it reinforces the tendency to seek “solutions” outside the host society rather than within it, and it does not adequately fulfill that Office’s broad responsibilities to stimulate change (Annex 1).

Indeed, there is reason to be concerned that a narrow approach to monitoring *may not fully reflect principles of international human rights law*, and secondly, *it may not be providing an accurate picture*, even within its own limited substantive parameters.

Firstly, it is one thing for NGOs to monitor only certain rights for reasons which include their chosen specialisation within the range of human rights applicable. It is

¹⁴ An important distinction should be clearly understood between overview fact-finding on the one hand, and investigations for prosecutions before a court of law, on the other.

¹⁵ This situation is classically illustrated by Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992-1993 when there were approximately 30,000 pairs of eyes (UN and other international personnel) on the ground observing and analysing the situation - yet with much of the country inaccessible due to security concerns. Had there been a human rights operation present, it would have been limited in its movements around the territory. Ensuring the Special Rapporteur was well-informed through the (then) Centre for Human Rights in Geneva involved channeling information in a timely fashion for analysis and combining it with a series of short-well-planned on site visits, (see note 3 above).

¹⁶ Indeed, some peace agreements under which human rights operations have operated have given express priority certain civil and political rights (such as MICIVIH in Haiti).

another to see inter-governmental organisations concentrating on a narrow range of rights without giving reasoned indications for their choice. The choice should clearly be based on host society needs - but it is difficult to see how this can be made without meaningful input from the host society regarding what it understands those needs to be. Thus, by the time the Rwanda operation began in the immediate post-genocide context of 1994, the assumptions flowing from the experience of previous operations meant it was understood that this operation too would focus primarily on monitoring, and that the rights monitored would be civil and political - despite the broad and flexible mandate allowing its priorities to evolve over time. The operation has not apparently monitored economic, social and cultural rights (or discrimination in their enjoyment) or contributed to the much-needed development of methods and indicators in this area. This, despite the fact that the host state agreement refers broadly to one of its functions as monitoring "the human rights *situation*".

Most fundamentally, such a selective approach is contrary to the principles of the indivisibility, inter-dependence and universality of human rights which are the cornerstone of the High Commissioner's mandate (see Annex 1).

Secondly, the picture received from such operations may not be complete so long as methods and indicators for tracing patterns of improvement in the human rights situation have yet to be developed and conveyed through training to field staff:

Reporting should include not only verified violations, but also verified patterns of improvements in the human rights situation. Authorities who are not credited with improvements (where they occur) may quickly lose faith in the benefit of doing so, so that the inaccurate report becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy. To facilitate the scientific measurement of improvements, further consideration should be given to techniques familiar to non-lawyers...¹⁷

Once information is gathered, the monitoring culminates in *reporting to headquarters of the deploying organisation*. It is not designed, or directed towards informing those most concerned - the people of the host state. Thus, in Rwanda, the operation in failing to prioritise host society needs, did not contribute as it might have, to resolving the entrenched situation in the camps during the Rwandan refugee crisis in Tanzania and the former Zaire.¹⁸

Overall, it appears that in a few short years, the emphasis on monitoring has crystallised into an inflexible, automatic approach fulfilling the letter of a narrowly-interpreted mandate, which does not necessarily take reasoned account of the imperatives of the actual situation. Here, it should be clear that the need for effective information-gathering and accurate analysis is not in issue. Rather, the experience of the predicted genocide in Rwanda in 1994 illustrates that it is a *necessary, but not sufficient*, condition for the protection of human rights. Of itself, information sent to headquarters, even assuming it is timely, comprehensive and reliable, changes nothing. The people of Rwanda have certainly learned that waiting for external protection can be a futile

¹⁷ Kenny K, note 1 at p.22

¹⁸ Confusion has been created regarding the legal authority for the establishment of HRFOR (Rwanda), apparently as non-solution to the question of what the relationship should be between a country special rapporteur and a human rights operation under the Office of the High Commissioner. The result has been a failure to meet the needs of the people of Rwanda for comprehensive, reliable, timely, information about the human rights situation in their country - though periodic reports were requested in the original resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, and even though the High Commissioner clearly has the *ex officio* mandate to provide it (see part II of this paper).

exercise. Part II of this paper highlights ways to assure the primary role of that host society

iii) Technical assistance, institution-building. Terminology is notoriously vague in this area and the lack of conceptual clarity derives at least in part from administrative arrangements. Until 1997, the (then) Centre for Human Rights had a branch responsible for servicing the fact-finding carried out by the special procedures such as Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups. A different branch was charged with providing “technical assistance” at the request of states. This usually meant training for judges, police; expert advice on drafting human rights legislation, and so forth. Historically, the latter was almost entirely headquarters-based with short field visits by trainers, as an example. It is now sometimes suggested that the provision of technical assistance is itself partly a justification for having a large-scale, relatively long-term field presence. Discussion of field tasks increasingly revolves around the need for some combination of “monitoring” on the one hand, and “technical assistance” on the other, with increasing emphasis on their being linked in a cycle and mutually re-enforcing.

None of the three main rationales have yet been subjected to rigorous analysis: presence as deterrence, monitoring, technical assistance/institution-building. Of themselves, they do not present a compelling case for a large-scale human rights operation, in a clearly identified set of circumstances. More importantly, they do not adequately reflect the mandate of the High Commissioner for Human Rights nor the legal imperative of mainstreaming human rights across all the UN’s activities.

4. *The need for information and accountability*

Whatever the rationales proposed and their relative persuasiveness, a prerequisite for meaningful review of present and past operations is comprehensive, reliable and disinterested information.

Discussions of human rights operations internationally have not included the constituency most qualified to speak on the subject- the societies which have played host to them. There continues to be a near total absence of input from those who have hosted, or are hosting, operations. This not only excludes a vital source of information for assessing the merits of such operations but is symptomatic of a more structural weakness of current approaches which see the host society as something of an afterthought, or somehow outside of, the process. In traditional diplomatic manner, a rather statist approach has been applied. This may be partly due to the early operations having being run from the political organs of the UN in New York, and partly due to the need to tread softly with a new operational tool for fear of being accused of failure to respect “sovereignty”. The High Commissioner’s mandate and the legal imperative of mainstreaming human rights means that these two factors should be less significant in the future (see part II).

There has been no internal or external procedure for independent evaluation of any of the human rights operations as such - whether fielded by the UN or the OSCE.¹⁹

¹⁹ However, a step forward for the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the decision of the Permanent Council to request the Head of Mission, Ambassador Barry, to report on the impact of

In contrast, donor-led insistence on independent evaluations is becoming relatively common for related field work such as that carried out by UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs.²⁰

There continues to be no systematic process of debriefing for lessons learning of any kind for the hundreds of personnel who have now served with the various human rights operations, a cause of frustration and disillusionment among many such staff.²¹

In the absence of a mechanism to record and objectively assess their experience, it is not surprising that since the El Salvador beginnings there has been little perceptible evolution in the overall practices applies from one human rights operation to another²². Each has started from the same basic assumptions, and most have failed to learn adequately (or in some cases, at all) from the weaknesses and strengths of earlier operations.

5. Equating presence with success

Much current discussion concerning human rights operations focuses on the logistics of getting international staff there, ensuring supply of vehicles, communications and administrative back-up.²³ These have been inadequate in all human rights operations to date and no doubt can benefit from appraisal. However, these “housekeeping” matters are in danger of over-shadowing more profound, inter-related, questions such as:

*Why is the human rights operation here, what is its aim?
By what yardstick can success be measured, and by whom?
When will it have prepared the way for it to responsibly leave?*

Some would have us view human rights operations as if international interventions are necessarily, and always, the right response. It is assumed, explicitly or

its human rights and democratisation programmes by end of 1998. For the UN, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Lessons Learned Unit conducted an internal mid-term assessment for MICIVIH in Haiti, while the European Commission twice independently evaluated its contribution to the HRFOR in Rwanda.

²⁰ . Examples include the *Independent report on Humanitarian Co-ordination in the Great Lakes*, March 1998; the DANIDA *Joint Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Rwanda Crisis* 1995. “Independent” is used here in the sense of disinterest regarding outcomes. The risk of vested personal or institutional interest in arriving at the most (or least) favourable assessments should be actively minimised.

²¹ An important contribution towards comparing experience of various human rights operations has been made in 1995 and 1998 by the publication of the views of some commentators by the Aspen Institute (see <http://www.aspeninst.org/>). Generally, for some major human rights operations the reflections of a senior manager who served in it are collected and significant issues and common analysis results. These are not however substitutes for systematic, comprehensive, independently analysed information.

²² The International Human Rights Network is working in a practical way to help find solutions to this (see Annex 3).

²³ An important exception is the work of Todd Howland, “Mirage, magic or Mixed bag? The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights' Field Operation in Rwanda”, *Human Rights Quarterly* 1998 (forthcoming).

implicitly, that human rights operations do “positive things” - itself an extraordinarily low threshold by which to measure achievement. Indeed, there is a strain of thinking which equates presence with success - instead of presence as a means to an identified goal. In this context, for those deploying or managing a human rights operation, there is *little or no difference between “success” and “failure”*. Worse, success is sometimes equated with its cost, or the number of people on the ground. A senior UN official’s view has become known as the *magic presence* view: the fact of having a large number of junior field personnel on the ground meant that the operation would have “succeeded”. The mere fact of producing a report, delivering training to local police and so forth is related to the international community as ends in themselves - as the success justifying the human rights operation.

Indeed, Alex de Waal’s comment regarding international human rights non-governmental organisations may equally be applied to the present context:

“In human rights discourse...it is axiomatic that any human rights organisations are beneficial, and that their activities are all successful, even if they have merely succeeded in restating a principle and publicising a violation.... This will no longer do.”²⁴

International organisations and donors are faced with difficult choices as to the most effective interventions in human rights emergencies. As the previous section outlined, the rationale for each human rights operation requires in-depth examination, particularly where “peace agreement verification” is not in issue. The question is whether large-scale human rights operations are the most appropriate tool to achieve a specified goal in any particular situation. There should be a balanced attempt to identify possible negative effects such as those associated with many forms of international presence: creation or continuation of dependency, diversion of resources from more direct support to targeted elements of host society, or providing an “alibi” for an international policy vacuum where more robust action is required. As we know from the inter-linked work of humanitarian assistance and development, the assumption that international presence only has positive effects is not a safe one.²⁵ The choice should not be misleadingly presented as - either the international community sends a human rights operation - or it does nothing. Instead, their use should be weighed against other, perhaps more sustainable, means of channelling resources towards supporting the host society’s efforts (see part II).

²⁴ Alex de Waal, *“Becoming Shameless: The failure of human rights organisations in Rwanda”*, Book review, *Times Literary Supplement*, 21 February 1997, p.3.

²⁵ It will seem extraordinary to specialists in those areas that the self-examination which has characterised their work throughout the 1990s has yet to begin relation to international human rights field work. See for example, Guy Goodwin-Gill, “Refugee Identity and Protection’s Fading Prospect”, revised, expanded and updated version of a paper presented at the Conference on “Refugee Rights and Realities”, University of Nottingham, 30 November 1996, forthcoming in *Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes*, Nicholson, Frances and Twomey, Patrick eds., Cambridge University Press, 1998; Erin D Mooney, “Presence Ergo Protection? UNPROFOR, UNHCR and ICRC informer Yugoslavia”, 7 *IJRL* 436(1995); “Painful lessons in how to say no: aid agencies find that handouts can make an intolerable situation worse” *Independent on Sunday*, 12 April 1998.

Conclusion: the watershed

If reliable information concerning present and past operations is the first prerequisite for a review of their roles, an additional pre-condition is that there should be clear understanding of what an operation can, and should be expected to achieve. The yardstick by which we measure “success” of a human rights operation should be clearly conceptualised and articulated. This goes to the heart of the issue. Without an effective dialogue and partnership with the host civil society, priorities have not always been consciously set in accordance with host society needs. In the absence of such an approach, the question inevitably arises: whose interests do human rights operations serve? If current approaches continue there is clearly the danger that human rights operations will be seen as serving the interests of the deploying organisation - rather than the host society whose human rights it is ostensibly there to protect and promote.

Part II

A vision to reflect international human rights law:

Human Rights Support Programmes

1. Introduction

This part of the paper presents, in outline, IHRN's alternative vision for future field-based human rights work guided by the High Commissioner, whether carried out by the UN or others. It requires a fundamental re-think of the aim, attitude and methods of human rights field activities. It requires that success be measured by the degree to which temporary presence has contributed to a sustainable improvement in the human rights situation.

The terminology proposed to encapsulate such future field work is *Human Rights Support Programmes*. This is because "support" conveys the fundamental shift in attitude towards a *constructive partnership based on the primacy of the host society*. It conveys *assisting and reinforcing* rather than replacing or duplicating local efforts. Programme emphasises *process and long-term vision with sustainability at the core*. Similarly, those who work in these Programmes should be termed Human Rights Support *Partners*.²⁶

The terminology is premised on the High Commissioner's mandate and the need for host society participation.

2. The High Commissioner's ex officio mandate

The High Commissioner has a very flexible overall mandate which not only allows her actions to be tailored to the host societies' needs, but requires it, given that the circumstances vary within states over time (Annex 1).

The High Commissioner's mandate derives from the Charter and international human rights law and as such cannot be changed through negotiation with a putative host state. The law applicable to her mandate is inherent to her office and applies equally to all states.

The Human Rights Support Programme is based on the High Commissioner's *ex officio* mandate covering the full spectrum of human rights which she seeks to reflect in the actions and programmes of her Office, including the principles of the universality, indivisibility and inter-dependence of all human rights. Thus, while the exact human rights treaty obligations will vary according to states' ratifications - these principles inhere to the Office and should clearly apply to all the situations it addresses. This *ex officio*

²⁶ The word *partner* is to mark a shift away from the previous pattern of exclusion of host society from the identification of tasks, priorities and evaluation of field-based human rights work carried out by the UN or other inter-governmental organisations.

mandate should be clearly understood as the basis for a state's invitation to her Office to establish a Support Programme.

3. Priorities identified through host society dialogue

Each host society has a right and duty to determine its own human rights priorities - as reflected in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.²⁷ *Host society* includes but is not limited to host authorities at all levels, and involves the range of civil society actors such as non-governmental organisations, church and women's groups, individuals, and so forth.

Within the parameters of the core principles, the priorities of a Support Programme should not be set in a far away meeting, or in a New York or Geneva resolution - rather through dialogue with the host society. Only through such dialogue will the daily tasks of the Support Programme be those most likely to effect a sustainable improvement of human rights needs.²⁸

Such dialogue, involving genuine empowerment of the civil society in whom "ownership" of the Support Programme is vested, of itself, would have positive human rights effects in terms of participation in public life. It would also, *ipso facto*, generate enhanced local acceptance of this international presence because its menu of options would be debated locally and choices made to reflect local needs. Such public involvement is an essential element of legitimacy and a pre-condition for achieving sustainability. In this way, the Support Programme approach should facilitate early involvement, before a crisis explodes, with real possibilities for preventive action.

Part I of this paper sought a rationale to justify, or a concept to explain, the comparative advantage of field presence. Here, it is suggested that a convincing rationale would be *engagement with the host society* at all levels from the grassroots.

4. Measuring success: sustainability

The Sustainability Principle stipulates that:

"[T]hat Human Rights Operations must be based on the assessed needs of a host society, and co-ordinated with other complementary initiatives, so as to best contribute to a sustainable improvement of the human rights situation as part of an overall human rights strategy. This requires the active participation of the host society."²⁹

This emphasises the need to re-think the time-scale of human rights field work. Support Programmes should reflect the truism that it takes generations to develop or re-create a human rights culture. Equally, the Sustainability Principle means that a human

²⁷ In the present context, the point was also illustrated by the priorities set for MICIVIH (Haiti) expressly in its mandate to prioritise certain rights such as freedom of assembly.

²⁸ By definition, violations of non-derogable human rights would be automatically priorities to be addressed.

²⁹ See Annex 2.

rights culture cannot be presented as a gift from outside.

5. Field human rights tasks - by all means necessary

Part I described the development of human rights operations, as limited by a narrow range of methodologies centred around human rights reporting.

Here, two types of tasks should automatically be included in the Support Programme. The first, *diagnostic monitoring* means the gathering of information to analyse and identify patterns of violations or non-fulfillment so as to pin-point exactly the reasons for such weaknesses. This is a necessary on-going task to:

- *provide accurate, timely analysis to inform the host society debate regarding the full spectrum of human rights;*
- accurately target the Support Programme to host society needs, including identifying any lack of will on the part of host authorities, requiring more robust responses in the second category of tasks; and
- ensure analytical leadership for the range of interventions by other actors. For the UN agencies, this reflects the High Commissioner's role in mainstreaming human rights.

Diagnostic monitoring is merely the first step in the Support Programme's activities and not an end in itself. All activities of the Support Programme which follow-up the recommendations yielded by its diagnostic monitoring are called its *human rights development tasks*. These range from action by the Programme itself, such as disseminating its analysis in the local languages - to facilitating action by other UN agencies, the host authorities, host civil society, by donors, the Commission on Human Rights and so forth.

Examples of these tasks include public education campaigns to strengthen the awareness of, and demand for, human rights; grassroots reconciliation work, contributing the experience of other states to a national debate on impunity, truth and justice; capacity-building (see selection and training below), facilitating community development. Where diagnostic monitoring reveals a need for tough messages to be transmitted to the host authorities, this too is an essential element of the human rights development work of a Support Programme.³⁰

It is in this bundle of human rights development activities that technical assistance (training in the justice system, legislative drafting advice and so forth) and institution-building conceptually belong. The Support Programme approach thus resolves the artificial monitoring/technical assistance debate by providing a coherent conception of all UN field-based human rights work.

The bundle of activities defy prior definition but rather will continually evolve over time. The field techniques to be developed for the future should learn from systematic debriefing of all staff and the independent evaluation of past human rights operations, with meaningful input into that process from the host societies. "Traditional" human rights

³⁰ The Programme is to support elements of the host society committed to sustainable improvement of the human rights situation - not to support the state, as such.

techniques should be reassessed with flexibility and creativity to meet actual needs. Overall, with the coming to fruition of attempts to mainstream human rights in the UN, daily field tasks should be thoroughly reviewed. For example, they should be premised on *two-way mainstreaming of human rights and development thinking* so as to open Support Programmes to methodologies from the human right to development field.³¹

Thus, in their daily tasks, Support Programmes should explore “all means necessary” guided by human rights law and principle.

6. Selection and training of partners - local and international

To date, human rights operations have been a tool used in emergencies or immediately post-conflict, rather than in preventive early deployments. In such situations, security concerns (including a highly stratified political context) have been assumed to preclude the employment of local nationals in substantive positions. This approach has meant human rights operations have not prioritised active nurturing of local capacity as early as they might have, or at all, in some cases.

Generally, the presumption that only international staff do substantive work has been a feature of human rights operations. This may be due to the narrow assumptions on which they have based their field techniques. Previously, “monitoring” and “technical assistance” have been understood, designed, delivered, and defined as requiring temporary international presence.³²

These should not be the dominant features of Human Rights Support Programmes. The Support Programme approach should make an early, and on-going relationship with the host society feasible, thus achieving preventive “deployment” before there is a crisis. Thus, once the initial priority tasks have been identified for a Support Programme, staff partners should be selected, recruited and trained in function of those tasks - and not before. Implications may include there being less need for lawyers than has hitherto been the case and more need for senior management with development backgrounds. In addition, the starting point of a Support Programme should be its capacity-building, supportive role vis-à-vis local efforts. While each situation will vary, one aspect of this is that there should be a presumption that local partners carry out the Support Programme’s work unless security concerns dictate otherwise:

“An emphasis on sustainability has consequences for selection of personnel: each [Human Rights Support Programme] should consider how to benefit from skills available locally having due regard to the need to ensure security of information provided [in its diagnostic monitoring role] as well as any possible risk to such local staff in being associated with [it]. This can best be achieved by clearly identifying the different tasks to be carried out. At present, the principle of sustainability is very far from being reflected in the staff of HROs, but there are precedents. For example, locally recruited nationals of the host state have worked as “assistants” to the EU component’s human rights promotion work within HRFOR (Rwanda) and in analysis of the local media for the [High

³¹ See *Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development*, A UNDP policy document, January 1998.

³² Of course, local actors play indirect key roles such as providing information to an operation.

*Commissioner's] small field presence in the former Yugoslavia.*³³

The relatively recent focus on standby rosters and advance generic training can potentially be adapted from the context of human rights operations to facilitate Support Programmes.

7. Mainstreaming - mutual learning across the UN

The legal imperative that human rights be mainstreamed across all UN activities requires that human rights field tasks be understood as a shared concern requiring systematic mutual learning. Thus, it is not only those specifically labeled 'human rights specialists' who have human rights responsibilities vis-a-vis the host society.

However, there is a tendency to see mainstreaming as a one-way process by which the High Commissioner's concerns are fed into all other activities. Just as with the previous conception of host society, this tendency has meant that field partners were approached merely as *sources of human rights information* for an operation. Such an approach runs contrary to mainstreaming and ignores important field lessons which military, police, or development practices can offer Support Programmes (see tasks above).

Of particular importance is the field experience relating to the human right to development which should be mainstreamed into the High Commissioner's reflections on Support Programmes. The human right to development includes concepts of sustainability, accountability (see next section), social audit indicators, stakeholders and beneficiaries and placing participation and gender concerns firmly at the core in order to maximise sustainability. In particular, building local capacity should be the conscious priority of a Support Programme from the outset (see staff above). This approach will help provide needed exit strategies based on attainable objectives.

In this context of *two-way mainstreaming*, Support Programmes should be developed in the context of UN human rights field tasks, including peacekeeping, as a whole. This clearly does not involve supplanting roles of field partners such as the UN Development Programme, UN Children's Fund (Unicef), the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and so forth. Rather, it should provide the analytical basis for the High Commissioner to *ensure leadership*, as she has herself described her role, for coherent human rights approaches across the organisation.³⁴ A Human Rights Support Programme should therefore inform all UN responses - military, political, development, humanitarian aid.

Consequentially, vital questions that arise are:

- *how will such field partners adapt to meet their field human rights responsibilities; and*
- *how will they relate to the work of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the field, and vice versa?*

³³ Note 1, at p. 26. This also occurred in exceptional ways with MICIVIH (Haiti).

³⁴ Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Third Committee, the fifty-second session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 14 November 1997.

8. Accountability

Human Rights Support Programmes of the High Commissioner should be characterised by the following elements of accountability:

- on-going host society dialogue on the Programme's priorities and tasks;
- on-going independent evaluation;
- management by clear objectives and publicly debated exit strategy based on their achievement;
- systematic debriefing of all partners, local and international, for lessons to be learned; and
- effective host society input into evaluating impacts.

9. Considered use of Support Programmes

Particular problems arise where a state invites the High Commissioner to establish a presence, but its authorities purport to reject the process of dialogue through which its priorities would be set. This poses a dilemma for the High Commissioner for the state is thereby denying the key participation of civil society in the process. Such a rejection may indicate that a Support Programme of the High Commissioner is not the most appropriate response to human rights needs in that state and would, in such circumstances, be ineffective in applying the Sustainability Principle. In such a case, the range of strategies other than a High Commissioner's Support Programme should be explored. There will continue to be situations where other methods of addressing human rights situations are more appropriate.

10. Support Programmes - the UN leading by example

The strong conceptual base of Support Programmes should help underpin the High Commissioner's advisory, collaborative role with such partner organisations. It is increasingly understood that common challenges are faced by the several organisations which have been involved in mandating, fielding or funding human rights operations - whether the European Commission, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe or the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. These include the need to pool common experience and contribute to best practices in areas such as training - as well as questions of coherence and co-ordination from the field to headquarters levels.

Developing Support Programmes in the manner discussed here would allow the High Commissioner to lead such regional organisations by example. It is important to ensure that coherent approaches based on international law and principle are applied in the activities of the UN member states when they act,³⁵ frequently with the blessing of the UN, through other inter-governmental organisations.

³⁵ The opportunity for leadership by the High Commissioner and fruitful mutual learning is great.

Conclusion

Key principles underpin today's relevance of the Declaration of 1948: the universality, indivisibility and inter-dependence of the full spectrum of human rights. The International Human Rights Trust works to improve the effectiveness and relevance of international human rights field work carried out by the range of bodies involved - as it appreciates the potential inherent in such field work. Through its on-going work regarding training for human rights field tasks; and currently in support of the High Commissioner for Human Rights seeking mechanisms for lessons-learning, IHRN hopes to contribute to the practical application of these principles.

In the course of this work, it has become apparent that at the core of the tool known as "human rights operations" is a conceptual void which prevents them achieving their full potential. For example, any improvement in training for field human rights tasks will remain of limited impact unless we know what we are training for, *what our aim is*.

This is the context in which this discussion paper is being circulated. It does no more than offer a conceptual framework for what UN, other inter-governmental organisations and member states are mandated, and obliged, to do under international human rights law:

*"Half a century after the adoption of the Declaration, it is time to embark on a new stage in our journey to bring it's message to life for all people"*³⁶

For example, the OSCE has recently appointed a senior diplomat to make proposals regarding its training requirements. There, ideas such as exchange of staff, establishing as advisory panel, a forum for regular input from the range of relevant disciplines, common training with other field partners (military, development, human rights specialist - NGO and IGO) to break down mutual stereotypes.

³⁶ Note 7, above.

Annex 1

Mandate of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

The mandate of the High Commissioner for Human Rights flows from the Charter of the United Nations and international human rights law. In operational terms it is set out in UN General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993 as follows:

“The High Commissioner shall be the United Nations official with principal responsibility for the United Nations human rights activities under the direction of the Secretary General.

The High Commissioner’s responsibilities shall be:

- (a) To promote and protect the effective enjoyment by all of all civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.*
- (b) To carry out the tasks assigned to him/her by the competent bodies of the United Nations system in the field of human rights and to make recommendations to them with a view to improving the promotion and protection of human rights.*
- (c) To promote and protect the realisation of the right to development and to enhance support from relevant bodies of the United Nations system for this purpose.*
- (d) To provide, through the Centre for Human Rights of the Secretariat and other appropriate institutions, advisory services and technical and financial assistance, at the request of the State concerned and, where appropriate, the regional human rights organisations, with a view to supporting actions and programmes in the field of human rights.*
- (e) To co-ordinate relevant United Nations education and public information programmes in the field of human rights.*
- (f) To play an active role in removing current obstacles and in meeting the challenge to the full realisation of all human rights and in preventing the continuation of human rights violations throughout the world, as reflected in the Vienna Declaration and programme of Action.*
- (g) To engage in a dialogue with all Governments in the implementation of his/her mandate with a view to securing respect for all human rights.*
- (h) To enhance international co-operations for the protection and promotion of all human rights.*
- (i) To co-ordinate the human rights promotion and protection activities throughout the UN system.*
- (j) To rationalise, adapt, strengthen and streamline the United Nations machinery in the*

field of human rights with a view to improving efficiency and effectiveness.

(k) To carry out overall supervision of the Centre for Human Rights.”

The above resolution also states:

“The High Commissioner for human Rights shall...recognise the importance of promoting a balanced and sustainable development for all people and of ensuring realisation of the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development”

Annex 2

Statement of Principles

**ROUND TABLE
on the
Promotion of the Rule of law through
Effective training for field human rights tasks**

28-29 November 1996

A round table of international human rights specialists was convened by the International Human Rights Trust in Dublin on 28-29 November 1996. The round table was sponsored by the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Warsaw, and opened by Ms Joan Burton, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

The round table agreed that the promotion of democratic principles, the rule of law and the promotion and protection of all human rights are the basis of sustainable peace, security and development. It noted the importance of comprehensive international co-operation on human rights issues and underlined the need to develop sustainable and appropriate responses to the critical challenges of justice, impunity and reconciliation.

The round table supported the study *Towards Effective Training for Field human Rights Tasks*, by Karen Kenny and congratulated the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland for its initiative in commissioning the study.

The round table emphasised the particular contribution which well-planned and managed human rights operations can make to the objectives outlined in paragraph 1, and noted:

- The need for a considered approach to the use of human rights operations to assess whether they are the most appropriate response.
- That human rights operations must be based on the assessed needs of a host society, and co-ordinated with other complimentary initiatives, so as to best contribute to a sustainable improvement in the overall human rights strategy. This requires the active participation of the host society.
- This Sustainability Principle should be the determining factor in deciding:
 - When a human rights operation is appropriate;
 - A human rights operation's mandate, resources and continuity;
 - The strategies, priorities, tasks and deployment which the human rights operation applies in pursuance of its mandate;
 - The profiles of the people to be recruited and their conditions of work;
 - The on-going process of training they are to receive; and
 - A responsible phasing-out strategy.

- The critical need for a continuing process to develop standards for the selection and training of personnel.
- The urgent need for evaluation criteria to assess effectiveness and measure outcomes. Management by objectives is vital, with priorities of the human rights operation evolving according to the human rights needs of the host society. Independent evaluations should be standard practice and their recommendations actively followed-up.
- The potential benefits of standby personnel resource bank initiatives such as that in place in Norway (NORDEM) and that being developed in Canada.

The round table participants agreed to a follow-up process to address the shortcomings identified in current approaches. It envisaged a broad-based participatory follow-up with all relevant actors to ensure early and on-going action.

**ROUND TABLE
PARTICIPANTS**

**Promotion of the Rule of law through
Effective training for field human rights tasks
28-29 November 1996**

Participants

- Ms Armineh Arakelian-Davidian, UN Human Rights Field Operation Rwanda
- Mr Robert Buergenthal, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
- Mr Roger Calatayud, Council of Europe
- Mr Justin Carroll, Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland
- Ambassador Audrey Glover, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
- Mr Martin Greene, Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland
- Ms Kirstin Hogdahl, Norwegian Institute for Human Rights
- Mr Todd Howland, Human Rights Programme Harvard University
- Ms Barbara Jones, Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland
- Ms Sibylle Kapferer, UN Centre for Human Rights
- Ms Karen Kenny, The International Human Rights Trust
- Mr Paul LaRose-Edwards, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada (consultant)
- Ms Maura Leen, Trocaire Ireland
- Mr Brian McKeown, The International Human Rights Trust
- Mr Seamus Molloy, Department of Foreign Affairs of Ireland
- Ms Francesca Mosca, Commission of the European Community
- Ms Hanna Nolan-Kolff, MSF- Holland
- Mr Bill O'Neill, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
- Mr Henk van den Kwast, Commission of the European Community